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Abstract 
Linguistic intuitions are a central source of evidence across a variety of linguistic domains. They 
have also long been a source of controversy. This chapter aims to illuminate the etiology and 
evidential status of at least some linguistic intuitions by relating them to error signals of the sort 
posited by accounts of on-line monitoring of speech production and comprehension. The 
suggestion is framed as a novel reply to Michael Devitt’s claim that linguistic intuitions are 
theory-laden “central systems” responses, rather than endorsed outputs of a modularized 
language faculty (the “Voice of Competence”). Along the way, it is argued that linguistic 
intuitions may not constitute a natural kind with a common etiology; and that, for a range of 
cases, the process by which intuitions used in linguistics are generated amounts to little more 
than comprehension. 
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1. Introduction 
A substantial portion of the evidential base of linguistics consists in linguistic intuitions—
speakers’ typically non-reflective judgments concerning features of linguistic and language-like 
stimuli. These judgments may be elicited, for example, in answer to such questions as:   
 
Is the following sentence natural and immediately comprehensible, in no way 
bizarre or outlandish (cf. Chomsky’s (1965) gloss on “acceptability”)? 
She likes chocolate anymore. 
 
Just going by how it sounds, /ptlosh/ is not a possible word in English, but /losh/ 
is. Please rate the following candidates on a scale from 1 (definitely not possible) 
to 5 (definitely possible): 
/fant/, /zgant/, … 
 
Do the bolded terms in this sentence co-refer (Gordon & Hendrick 1997)? 
John’s roommates met him at the restaurant. 
 
Which phrase are you most likely to use with a friend when leaving (Labov 
1996)? 
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(a) goodbye   (b) bye   (c) bye-bye   (d) see you   (e) so long 
 
Because of their evidential centrality, linguistic intuitions have been the focus of much 
methodological reflection. There are well-known worries concerning both how they are collected 
and how they are used: for example, linguists often use themselves as subjects, risking 
confirmation bias; they may gather too few intuitions to enable statistical analysis; and they may 
rely on intuitions too much, failing to seek converging (or disconfirming) evidence of other sorts. 
There are also well-known replies to these worries: for example, intuitions are often now 
gathered from a statistically well-powered number of naive subjects in a controlled setting; the 
comparisons that such work has enabled with linguists’ own intuitions have tended to validate 
linguists’ intuitions; and there is an ever-growing exploration of other sources of evidence. Much 
more can be said on these matters. (For reviews with further discussion and references, see, e.g., 
Schütze 1996; Schütze 2011; Sprouse & Schütze forthcoming.) I mention these familiar debates 
to set them aside and to distinguish them from this chapter’s main question. All parties agree that 
linguistic intuitions can be and often are a good source of evidence. Why are they? What about 
their etiology enables them to be a good source of evidence? 
This chapter suggests that we assign a role to error signals generated by monitoring 
mechanisms. It will not establish that this is so, but instead aims to render it a plausible, 
empirically-motivated hypothesis and to consider some of its philosophical consequences. There 
exists a sizeable body of psycholinguistic research on language-related monitoring. But its 
potential relevance to the etiology, and thus evidential status, of linguistic intuitions has not been 
much explored.1 
It is not intended that the proposal extend to all linguistic intuitions. Methodological 
discussions of linguistic intuitions often focus on acceptability judgments as evidence in syntax, 
but judgments concerning other features—in the examples above, pronounceability, co-
reference, and likelihood of use, but not only those—play a significant evidentiary role as well. It 
is far from obvious that the same account can be given for each. Thus, after exploring the 
possible role of error signals in generating some judgments of unacceptability, I suggest that 
linguistic intuitions in fact do not form a natural kind with a shared etiology, discussing in 
particular the role of utterance comprehension. It’s also no part of my proposal that, in those 
cases where error signals do play some role, there are no other significant causal factors or 
sources of warrant. 
The etiology of linguistic intuitions is of interest for several reasons, beyond the intrinsic 
interest of better understanding any instance of the mind-brain’s goings-on. For one, progress on 
this specific case contributes to our understanding of intuitive judgment more generally, a topic 
of significance both for psychologists and philosophers (DePaul & Ramsey 1998). For another, 
there is the aforementioned question of linguistic intuitions’ evidential status. While their status 
as good evidence may not require a deeper knowledge of their etiology (Culbertson & Gross 
2009), such knowledge can certainly help clarify and further secure it. Finally, a better 
understanding of linguistic intuitions’ etiology enables us to more fully answer a challenge raised 
by Michael Devitt (2006a; 2006b) to mentalist conceptions of linguistics—conceptions on which 
linguistics is a branch of psychology investigating mental mechanisms and processes implicated 
specifically in language acquisition and linguistic behavior. Indeed, it is this challenge—and its 
bearing on broader questions in the philosophy of linguistics—that motivates and frames the 
                                                 
1 Important exceptions include Sprouse (2018) and, especially, Matthews (ms.). 
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present study. Accordingly, I begin by providing some background on Devitt’s views and the 
discussion it has elicited. 
 
2. Devitt on the “Voice of Competence” and his modest alternative 
Why can linguistic intuitions serve as evidence in linguistics? Devitt (2006a; 2006b) contrasts 
two answers.2 According to the “Voice of Competence” view that Devitt rejects, linguistic 
intuitions are the product of a modularized language faculty that alone delivers the relevant 
information, or content, to mechanisms responsible for judgment. Judgments with such an 
etiology, on this view, can provide fruitful evidence for linguistic theorizing because they 
directly reflect constraints built into mechanisms specifically implicated in language acquisition 
and linguistic behavior and thus provide speakers privileged access to the linguistic facts. It is 
this view that Devitt ascribes to proponents of a mentalist conception of linguistics.3 
According to Devitt’s own “modest” view, while linguistic competence may supply 
access to the phenomena linguistic intuitions are about, it does not supply the intuitions’ content. 
Rather, intuitions are arrived at via ordinary empirical investigation using the mechanisms 
responsible for judgment more generally (“central systems”). Linguistic intuitions, thus 
produced, can provide evidence for linguistic theorizing because experienced language-users, 
immersed in language, make fairly reliable judgments about many linguistic matters, just as 
those immersed in their local flora may be fairly reliable about aspects of it. Devitt calls his view 
“modest” because it needn’t advert to any mental states or processes beyond those to which any 
account of judgment is committed. Importantly, according to Devitt, linguistic intuitions, 
because they are empirical judgments, are theory-laden as all such judgments are. 
Devitt argues that his view provides a better answer to the question ‘Why are linguistic 
intuitions a good source of evidence?’. Among his main arguments is that, not only do we lack a 
positive account of how a module embodying grammatical constraints might generate intuitions 
suited to play the evidential role the mentalist requires, but it is hard to see how one might go: we 
lack so much as “the beginnings of a positive answer” (Devitt 2016b: 118). (Indeed, linguists 
themselves sometimes lament our relative ignorance of aspects of linguistic intuitions’ 
etiology—cf. Schütze 1996; Goldrick 2011.) It is this challenge that the present chapter aims to 
address. (We return below to some other considerations Devitt raises; still others are addressed in 
Maynes & Gross 2013.) 
It might illuminate why Devitt thinks there’s a problem in the first place if one notes that 
he raises this challenge specifically for conceptions of linguistic modules according to which 
grammatical constraints are embodied in computational operations rather than explicitly 
represented. If grammatical constraints were explicitly represented, then—Devitt suggests—
linguistic intuitions might be derived within the language module in a quasi-deductive fashion. 
                                                 
2 Devitt has developed and defended his views in a large number of subsequent papers, which 
can be found on his webpage. See also his reply in this volume. 
3 Context makes clear that Devitt uses the word ‘information’ here, not in the information-
theoretic sense, but to indicate representational content. Henceforth, I use ‘content’ to avoid 
confusion. Devitt uses ‘modular’ in the Fodorean sense (Fodor 1983). Mentalism about 
linguistics does not require accepting all aspects of Fodorian modularity (cf., e.g., Collins 2004 
for differences between Fodor and Chomsky on linguistic competence and modularity); and there 
are now a variety of conceptions of modularity on the market (e.g., Carruthers 2006). I will 
attempt to bracket these matters. 
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(Devitt assumes that the relevant intuitions are judgments of grammaticality. But in current 
practice, judgments of grammaticality are typically not sources of evidence, but rather reflective 
judgments made by theorists to explain judgments of acceptability and other sources of 
evidence—cf., e.g., Myers 2009. We return to this shortly.) Devitt’s challenge is raised in reply 
to those who reject the explicit representation of grammatical constraints, arguably the vast 
majority of researchers in the field. It asks how else such intuitions could arise in a way that 
affords the speaker privileged access to the linguistic facts, suggesting there may not be any 
other way. (Devitt rejects the Voice of Competence view as well for conceptions on which 
grammatical constraints are explicitly represented, albeit on other grounds.) 
But more is at stake than just the source and epistemic status of linguistic intuitions. 
Devitt’s argument for his “modest” view is part of a larger argument against mentalist 
conceptions of linguistics. Recall that, according to mentalist conceptions of linguistics, 
linguistics is a branch of psychology, investigating mechanisms specifically implicated in 
language acquisition and linguistic behavior. According to Devitt, linguistics is not, or ought not 
to be, so conceived. Rather, its object is, or should be, linguistic reality: the facts about language, 
or specific languages, which exist, independently of any specific speaker, as conventions among 
populations (as opposed to as Platonic abstracta a la Katz 1981). Devitt thus endorses an E-
language, rather than an I-language, conception of what linguistics is, or ought to be, about 
(Chomsky 1986). His view of linguistic intuitions fits into his larger argument as follows: If the 
Voice of Competence view best explained why linguistic intuitions can be evidence, that would 
supply a consideration in favor of the mentalist conception. But, argues Devitt, it doesn’t best 
explain it; so, it doesn’t supply such a consideration. Answering Devitt’s challenge thus speaks 
to this element of his abduction in favor of his anti-mentalist conception of linguistics. 
 
3. Clarifying the options and locating the current proposal 
In fact, matters are more complicated than deciding between the Voice of Competence view and 
Devitt’s “modest” alternative. These two views do not exhaust the possibilities, and indeed, in 
previous work, I have argued against both options. Briefly reviewing these arguments will help 
clarify the claims of the current chapter. 
Against Devitt’s view, Culbertson & Gross (2009) argue that one doesn’t find the 
divergence in linguistic intuitions it predicts. Devitt maintains that linguistic intuitions are 
theory-laden and so can diverge across speakers with different relevant background beliefs, 
including different commitments concerning linguistic theories. Indeed, Devitt—far from 
worrying about confirmation bias—argues that linguists should prefer their own linguistic 
intuitions to those of native speakers who are naïve regarding linguistics; for, the better (more 
reliable) linguistic intuitions will be those of speakers with better theories. But we found a high 
degree of consistency among subjects with varying degrees of expertise in linguistics, ranging 
from subjects with none at all up to practicing syntacticians. This suggests that linguistic 
intuitions—at least of the sort we elicited—may be fairly stable across changes in relevant 
background beliefs and experience and thus are not theory-laden in a way or to a degree that 
matters to linguistic inquiry. They may rather reflect their pre-judgmental etiology to a 
particularly robust degree.4 
                                                 
4 Devitt (2010) replies and Gross & Culbertson (2011) responds. ‘Reliable’ is used here not in 
the psychologist’s sense of being consistently produced in similar circumstances, but in the 
philosopher’s sense of tending to be accurate (as with a reliable thermometer)—what 
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On the other hand, Maynes & Gross (2013) argue inter alia against the Voice of 
Competence view—or at least reject the idea that mentalists should see themselves as committed 
to it. Recall that Devitt builds into his characterization of the Voice of Competence view that the 
language faculty itself outputs the content of the intuition (henceforth, the “content 
requirement”). But there is nothing about mentalism that requires this. Consider the judgment 
that some string is unacceptable. Mentalists needn’t commit themselves to the view that the 
language faculty itself outputs a state with the content That string is unacceptable. It can suffice 
that the parser fails to assign a structural description to the string and that the absence of a parse 
can in turn play a causal role in the process that leads the speaker to judge that the string is 
unacceptable. 
The inclusion of the content requirement stems from Devitt’s emphasis on speakers’ 
privileged access to linguistic facts. For, if the language module supplies the content of linguistic 
intuitions, that might explain the source of this privilege. Recall, however, that judgments of 
grammaticality (as opposed to, for example, acceptability) are not, or are no longer, typical of the 
meta-linguistic judgments linguists rely on as evidence. Mentalists, in relying on the kinds of 
linguistic intuitions they in practice do, thus need not assume that speakers have privileged 
access to whether strings are grammatical. (Perhaps speakers have defeasible privileged access 
regarding acceptability.) Mentalists need only maintain that linguists’ theorizing involves an 
abduction from linguistic intuitions—and any other available considerations—to claims about a 
language faculty. (Thus might they, for example, elicit acceptability judgments under varying 
conditions and with varying stimuli, intending to control for alternative explanations.) This does 
not require that speakers have privileged access regarding the ground or causal source of their 
judgments—in particular, privileged access to why they judge a sentence (un)acceptable. Indeed, 
sentences can be unacceptable for any number of reasons. To take a classic example: multiply 
center-embedded sentences may be judged unacceptable owing to memory limitations, instead of 
a grammatical violation. 
If linguistic intuitions are not theory-laden in the way Devitt expects, and if mentalists 
may reject the content requirement, then the positions Devitt discusses are not exhaustive. Thus, 
with Devitt’s alternative rejected in Culbertson & Gross (2009), Maynes & Gross (2013) defend 
a mentalist conception of linguistic intuitions sans the content requirement. This conception 
rejects as well the idea that a mentalist conception of linguistic intuitions’ evidential status 
requires that speakers possess privileged knowledge regarding grammaticality, while allowing 
that the special role grammaticality constraints can play in the generation of linguistic intuitions 
may enable those intuitions to serve as evidence for those constraints, in a manner relatively 
unaffected by changes in relevant belief and expertise.  
Against this background, we can clarify the aims of the present chapter. The suggestion 
bruited above that a failure to parse can cause a judgment of unacceptability is a rather bare 
etiological claim, even if “sufficient unto the day” in the context of Maynes & Gross’ (2013) 
response to Devitt. In what follows, I buttress this reply by developing further suggestions 
concerning the etiology of linguistic intuitions. In particular, I suggest that error signals 
generated by monitoring mechanisms may play a role in some cases. I also suggest, more briefly, 
                                                 
psychologists would call validity. Note that, although relative expertise in linguistics did not 
matter in our experiment, one group—those with no formal exposure to the mind-brain sciences 
at all—was an outlier. Culbertson & Gross (2009) hypothesize a deficiency in task knowledge. 
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that in other cases the intuition’s etiology may amount to little more beyond that of 
comprehension itself.  
Interestingly, these further suggestions provide some grounds for entertaining a stronger 
thesis than I previously defended. For, although mentalism per se needn’t build-in the content 
requirement, the error signal story, as we shall see, may allow the content requirement to be 
satisfied, at least by some intuitions—similarly, in some cases, for the comprehension account. 
The Voice of Competence view—or something like it (see below)—may thus be true after all, at 
least in those cases! But it’s important to note that this is indeed a further claim: one can parry 
Devitt’s etiological challenge without endorsing satisfaction of the content requirement. 
Devitt might reply that it is essential to the Voice of Competence view, as he conceives 
it, that speakers’ have privileged access to whether strings are grammatical. If so, satisfaction of 
the content requirement doesn’t suffice for the Voice of Competence view, even if it provides for 
a view that is otherwise like it. Likewise, it’s possible Devitt sees his etiological challenge as 
presupposing a mentalist endorsement of speaker’s privileged access concerning grammaticality. 
If so, our reply to the etiological challenge sans this presupposition is a reply to a variant of 
Devitt’s challenge, one suggested by it and worth addressing. But, in considering just what 
content error signals may have, we will also mention the even more speculative possibility that 
some error signals have content more specifically about grammaticality. The error signal story 
may thus even provide resources for someone attracted to a Voice of Competence view with 
some such privileged-access component built-in. (Some parallel indications are marked but not 
developed for comprehension cases.) Again, this would be a further claim, one that would go 
beyond maintaining that error signals have an etiological role and also beyond adding that they 
enable satisfaction of the content requirement.5 
 
4. Candidate monitoring mechanisms 
There’s no consensus regarding the mechanisms involved in monitoring language use (for a brief 
survey, see Nozari & Novick 2017, to which this section’s summary is indebted). But that some 
such mechanisms are involved in the prevention, detection, and correction of linguistic errors is a 
widespread view; and the correct details do not matter for my main point. Nonetheless, it’s worth 
indicating some of the more specific extant ideas, both for the sake of concreteness and to 
underscore that my suggestion isn’t ad hoc, but rather adverts to on-going, independently-
motivated theorizing. (In that sense, my suggestion is thus also modest.) In addition, though the 
mere existence of error signals generated by monitoring mechanisms might suffice for my reply 
to Devitt’s challenge, the details do matter for some more specific questions flagged below. 
                                                 
5 Henceforth, I use the ‘Voice of Competence’ label for the view that linguistic intuitions are the 
product of a modularized language faculty that alone delivers the relevant content to mechanisms 
responsible for judgment; and I take up the question of privileged access as a possible further 
requirement rather than building it in. It’s of course less important which positions are allowed 
the label, so long as the positions themselves are clear. Note that Rey’s (this volume; 
forthcoming) mentalist defense of the Voice of Competence view involves dropping the content 
requirement. He thus rejects Devitt’s characterization of the view, whereas Maynes & Gross 
(2013) deploy Devitt’s characterization (after all, it’s his term) in rejecting Devitt’s ascription of 
the view to the mentalist. 
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Initial ideas in this area were developed in theorizing about monitoring for speech 
production errors, and so we start with some examples of these. Production monitoring might 
seem not directly relevant to our topic, since linguistic intuitions are elicited in response to 
presented stimuli. But monitoring mechanisms have been posited in comprehension as well, and, 
according to some, monitoring mechanisms in production and comprehension are intimately 
related (Pickering and Garrod 2013). 
Maynes & Gross (2013) cite Levelt’s (1983; 1993) perceptual loop theory, according to 
which we monitor our production via comprehension. The basic idea is simply that we listen to 
what we ourselves say. Evidence for this includes that blocking auditory feedback with ambient 
white noise negatively affects our ability to catch production errors (Oomen et al. 2005). But it 
seems that this is not the only, perhaps not even the central, mechanism: among aphasic patients 
there is a double dissociation between comprehension and self-speech error detection (reviewed 
in Nozari et al. 2011). 
An alternative view hypothesizes that an efference copy of the motor command is sent to 
a forward model that generates, for checking, an expectation concerning future states of motor 
and/or sensory systems (Tian & Poeppel 2010). This temporally more plausible approach applies 
to linguistic production a widely-held view of motor control more generally (Wolpert 1997; 
Shadmehr 2010). It’s less clear, however, how classic versions of such views work or are 
motivated for higher-level, more abstract linguistic features such as syntactic structure, since 
such features are “up-stream” from motor commands. 
Conflict models (Nozari et al. 2011) do not require efference copies. On such views, what 
is monitored is the comparative activation level of candidate linguistic representations (lexical 
items, phonemes, etc.) with a conflict signal produced when the difference in activation is 
insufficient for there to be a clear winner. In production, this might occur, for example, when /b/ 
and /c/ both get activated, to a sufficiently close degree, when you’re trying to say ‘cat’. In 
comprehension, an ambiguous signal, for example, might likewise lead to competing candidate 
representations with insufficiently differentiated activation levels. 
Finally, there are many models of comprehension that incorporate prediction (Kutas et al. 
2011). For example, an incremental parser, governed by various grammatical constraints, may 
generate expectations regarding syntactic features of lexical items to come. A mechanism might 
then monitor discrepancies between what is expected and the in-coming signal. (Forward models 
are examples of monitoring mechanisms incorporating prediction on the production side. See 
Pickering & Garrod 2013 for an attempt to integrate prediction in production and 
comprehension.) 
Research in this area is active and on-going. But we needn’t place bets. We can consider 
the consequences should some such model pan out. 
 
5. Error signals and linguistic intuitions 
Whatever the model, suppose problems generate an error signal. Consider, for instance, a failure 
to parse owing to ungrammaticality. Perhaps, on a conflict model, no structural description is 
activated at a level sufficiently greater than the rest to “win” the competition among candidates; 
or, with a predictive parser, perhaps the signal’s completion fails to meet the expectations 
generated by previous material—perhaps even after attempted reanalysis. If monitoring 
mechanisms in such situations generate an error signal, then we are not limited to suggesting, as 
Gross & Maynes (2013) did, that a failure to parse yields an absence of output. The parser may 
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issue an error signal.6 The error signal, if it can in turn play a role in generating a judgment of 
unacceptability, enables us to elaborate our reply to Devitt’s etiological challenge. 
We can bolster the suggestion by noting various features such signals can have that mesh 
with features commonly associated with judgments of unacceptability. First, there’s negative 
valence. It’s an error signal after all. Likewise, subjects may express their negative judgment of 
a string by saying that it sounds bad. (Cf. Pietroski’s (2008) use of ‘yucky’—or ‘icky,’ another 
technical term I recently encountered in a linguist’s talk.) Second, error signals can have 
motivational force—corrective in production, corrective or aversive when interpreting others. 
(Maynes & Gross 2013 note the possible connection to social cognition and in-group/out-group 
identification.) Linguistic intuitions are typically divorced from actual use, concerning rather 
what one could or would say or understand; but they still may be associated with an off-line or 
dispositional motivational force. Third, error signals might suggest the violation of a norm—
indeed, perhaps they are a source of linguistic prescriptivism. Linguistic intuitions likewise may 
be associated with a sense of wrongness. Fourth, error signals may be graded—that is, they can 
come in various strengths. Defeated probabilistic predictions, for example, can be associated 
with varying degrees of surprisal. Similarly, the gradedness of linguistic intuitions has long been 
noted, whether in linguists’ use of varying marks (*, **, ?, *?) to record their own judgments or 
in the graded results of formally collected judgments ranked on a scale. 
Finally, each of these features may have associated phenomenology: a felt sense of 
badness, motivation, and/or norm-violation, of some particular strength. Often they may not, or 
not to a noticeable degree—otherwise the signals generated by the prevalent disfluency in 
ordinary speech might get in the way of conversational flow. But perhaps they may if attention is 
appropriately deployed—as it may well be when one is a subject performing an acceptability 
judgment task. Conscious or not, the signal may play a causal role in the generation of a 
linguistic intuition. Likewise, either way they may be relevant to the judgment’s epistemic status. 
But noting the possibility of error signals rising to consciousness lends some measure of 
introspective plausibility to the proposal. Moreover, states capable of consciousness arguably can 
play a particular sort of epistemic role that in-principle unconscious states cannot: they can serve 
as justifications for the epistemic agent (as opposed to serving at best as warrants unavailable to 
the agent)—in the case at issue, justifications for the person forming meta-linguistic judgments.7 
 
6. Error signals as the Voice of Competence? 
The parallels between error signals and judgments of unacceptability do not establish that error 
signals play a role in the generation of linguistic intuitions, but they help render it a plausible 
hypothesis worth exploring. Even harder to establish is the more speculative claim that such 
signals might satisfy the content requirement. Nevertheless, the possibility is worth serious 
consideration, and we can provide some motivation. 
                                                 
6 Indeed, a possibility—not the only possibility (here is a place the details do matter)—is that the 
absence of a parse, given the activation of the parser by the string, itself plays this very role. The 
monitoring system may be so constructed so as to construe the absence (given the cueing up of 
the parser by a language-like stimulus) as a signaling of error. (This would not allow, however, 
for gradedness.) Alternatively, the absence may partially constitute the error signal—or the error 
signal may be a completely distinct state. 
7 The nature and types of justification and their relation to conscious access is too large and 
controversial a topic to develop here. For some discussion and pointers, see Pappas (2017). 
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The error signal is a signal. It functions to deliver information to monitoring systems 
concerning what is occurring in language-related mechanisms, so as to initiate repair, 
reinterpretation, or some other corrective measure or appropriate response (perhaps including 
asking for clarification—cf. section 8 below). Moreover, the states it functions to deliver 
information about are representational states, concerning, for example, the structure of the 
presented string. Given the signal’s functional role—with these sorts of causes and with these 
sorts of downstream effects—it is a natural thought that the signal itself might have 
representational content. Whether that thought is correct depends on the criteria for a mental 
state’s bearing content, a highly contentious matter. But a leading view is that assigning a mental 
state content on the basis of what causes it and how it is consumed is warranted when doing so 
yields explanatory illumination (e.g., Shea 2007; 2012). Arguably, this condition is met by error 
signals: our understanding of what a monitoring system does involves our seeing the system as 
capable of being informed of a problem, and it is the error signal that does the informing. Note, 
moreover, that it seems in-principle possible for a monitoring system to itself be in error (see fn. 
10), so that a signal can misrepresent the state of the system being monitored. The possibility of 
misrepresentation is often considered a necessary condition of intentionality (Dretske 1986). 
Just what would be the content of an error signal? There are various natural candidates. 
But all seem to enable the satisfaction of at least some version of the content requirement. 
Consider again a failed parse and a subsequent judgment of unacceptability. The candidate gloss 
that most obviously would make the case is This string is unacceptable—or perhaps such close 
relatives as This string has unsurmountable problems or Something is wrong with this string (or 
variants that refer to the utterance). If the error signal’s content is thus glossed, then clearly, at 
least for such intuitions, one could defend the Voice of Competence view, even with its content 
requirement. In these cases, speakers’ judgments can reflect constraints built into a modularized 
language faculty that outputs the content contained in the judgment. 
That’s the clearest, best case, so far as satisfying the content requirement goes. But a 
consideration of alternatives only lends further support. Our opening gloss makes reference to 
the string. But perhaps the state is more purely interoceptive, indicating only how things are with 
the subject. If so, a better gloss might be: I have—or this mechanism has—encountered 
unsurmountable problems. It’s not obvious that the error signal itself makes no reference to the 
string as the locus of the problem; but, even if this is so, the content requirement may be 
satisfied. For it remains the case that linguistic processes yield a representation of the stimulus 
(minimally, a representation as of these phonemes and lexemes in this order). Plausibly this 
representation, together with the error signal, can supply the content of the unacceptability 
judgment. 
But perhaps the error signal indicates, not that the problem has become unsurmountable, 
but only that problems persist: There is (still) a problem. The further information that there are 
no options left or that further efforts are not worth the cost might require further states—for 
example, perhaps a monitoring state that indexes effort expended. Yet it would remain the case 
that error signals not only play an etiological role in the generation of the unacceptability 
judgment, but also supply content to monitoring states that (perhaps in concert with 
representation of the string itself) supply the content of the judgment. The content requirement 
would thus, again, still be satisfied. Similar remarks apply to the suggestion that error signals 
have imperatival content (cf. Klein’s (2007) imperatival view of the content of pain states)—
perhaps glossed as Appropriately respond to this problem!. (Suppose they only have such 
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content. If this is just additional content, no issue is raised.) The persistence of such states can 
play a role in generating states that indicate that there is nothing more worth doing. 
An intriguing—still more speculative—possibility is that the signal carries more specific 
information about the source or nature of the problem. Recall that we motivated the assignment 
of content to error signals by reflection on their functional role: to inform a monitoring system of 
a processing problem so as to respond appropriately. But, just as a fire department needs 
information concerning where an alarm is coming from if it is to do anything about it, so may the 
monitoring system require more specific information about the signal’s source or the kind of 
problem. Suppose the signal itself carries that information. In our example, given the source of 
the problem (a failure to parse owing to embodied grammatical constraints), one might argue that 
the signal has a content that reflects this specificity: not just that the string is unacceptable, but 
that it is ungrammatical (as opposed to unpronounceable, or pragmatically unacceptable, etc.). 
Indeed, perhaps in principle an error signal could indicate the nature of the violation even more 
specifically—e.g., subjacency violation. Some such suggestion might be particularly tempting if 
the monitoring mechanisms that consume such signals are domain-general, since a domain-
specific monitoring system might not need to sort among signals’ varying causes. Whether the 
monitoring systems implicated in language use are domain-general or domain-specific (or some 
of each) is an unresolved empirical question, one where the details matter (Nozari & Novick 
2017—but see Dillon et al. 2012 for some ERP evidence that error signals can encode their 
cause).8 
Suppose error signals do have more specific content. It would not follow that judgments 
caused by or based on them also have this more specific content. It’s one thing for a state to have 
some content and another for the subject to conceptualize it as such or even to be able to. 
Compare the representation of color features. The visual system might represent some object as 
having certain color features. But the color categories available to conceptual systems may be 
much coarser than those available to vision. (This could be so even if color perception is 
categorical, though see Witzel (forthcoming) for arguments that it isn’t.) Similarly, even if error 
signals represent more specifically the source or kind of error, it’s a further question whether the 
judgments subjects make on their basis do so as well. Thus, in principle an error signal with the 
content That string is ungrammatical could cause and be the basis for a judgment with the more 
generic content That string is unacceptable. If so, should we say the content requirement is 
satisfied? The signal and judgment do not have the same content. But the signal’s content 
warrants the judgment’s in a way that seems analogous to how perceptual contents more 
generally can warrant perceptually-based judgments with different but closely related contents 
(cf. Peacocke 2004 on canonical conceptualizations). I suggest that this should suffice for a 
content requirement worth preserving. 
The possibilities entertained so far are all consistent with denying speakers privileged 
access to grammaticality facts. Even if the signal’s content is supplied by linguistic competence 
(whatever level of specificity that content may have), it doesn’t follow that the speaker knows 
that it is. We generally have unreliable introspective access to the causal source of our 
judgments, and content not conceptualized as such is not available to judgment. Thus, the 
                                                 
8 In support of more specific content, one might also advert to subjects’ often being able to 
provide some indication of where the problem lies and to suggest fixes. It’s unclear, however, 
whether this on its own favors more specific error-signal content over a Devitt-like specification 
in judgment, in light of a less specific error signal. 
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“voice” of competence may be “heard”—in the sense of its causing and supplying a basis for a 
judgment—without the subject knowing that it is competence that’s “speaking.” Theorists would 
still need to engage in the hard work of inference to the best explanation—as, for example, is the 
case in trying to sort out whether the judgment data concerning binding phenomena reflect 
syntactic or pragmatic constraints (e.g., Chomsky 1981 and Reinhardt 1983). 
But suppose we contemplate the possibility that error signals about ungrammaticality can 
cause and support linguistic intuitions with corresponding content—meta-linguistic judgments 
with the content That is ungrammatical. This could help provide grounds—at least regarding 
some intuitions—for a Voice of Competence view that also requires privileged access to 
grammaticality facts. (Privileged access might require reliability as well. Perhaps cases such as 
sentences with multiple center-embeddings could be deemed outliers.) Thus might one try to 
defend a limited application of the full view Devitt opposes. The application, however, would be 
quite limited indeed if grammaticality judgments are in fact not often invoked as evidence, as 
opposed to in explanation. Still, perhaps subjects may in some cases feel and be able to express 
that a problem seems grammatical or in some sense structural. Linguists, with their theoretical 
expertise and fuller array of concepts, may even achieve further specificity: perhaps a particular 
case may feel like a subjacency violation.9 That said, methodological caution suggests that we 
distinguish more solid evidence from what may be merely theoretical hunches. But we needn’t 
dismiss the possibility of such linguistic intuitions out of hand, even if they are not given much 
weight or play in practice. (We mark below some other avenues of possible support.) 
The question of specificity bears on a challenge Devitt raises to the Voice of Competence 
view. He asks: If our competence “speaks” to us, why does it not say more? Why do linguists not 
find themselves with a broader array of speakers’ intuitions to draw on—specified in the 
linguist’s language of c-command, heads, etc.? Given our remarks above, we can divide the 
question in two: Why doesn’t the language module deliver more specific content (if it doesn’t)? 
And, supposing it does, why is it that speakers typically can’t non-reflectively conceptualize that 
content in judgment? It’s not clear that the mentalist’s inability to answer at present would be 
particularly problematic. But the questions are interesting nonetheless. One way to take them is 
as design questions, so that we might ask what purpose would be served by having things 
otherwise than they are, and whether things overall would be in some sense better if things were 
that way. We posed the question of domain-generality vs. domain-specificity of monitoring 
mechanisms in such a functional way. It’s important to bear in mind, however, first, that 
speakers may not achieve optimality regarding the generation of linguistic intuitions (there’s 
certainly no reason to expect our capacities to be optimal for enabling successful linguistics!); 
and, second, that our capacity for yielding intuitive meta-linguistic judgments may be a by-
product—for example, of monitoring systems that may operate in large part unconsciously. 
(Questions of function briefly recur in section 8.) 
 
7. Other linguistic intuitions, other sources 
                                                 
9 It is not enough that one possess the relevant concepts, though that is necessary and is a 
further—and later—achievement than acquiring language itself (Hakes 1980). If the concepts are 
to contribute content to intuitive judgments, one must also be able to deploy them unreflectively 
in conceptualizing one’s experience in response to presented strings. Acquiring syntactic 
concepts in a linguistics course may not suffice for this. 
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We have focused on intuitive judgments of unacceptability (remarking as well on the possibility 
of intuitive judgments of ungrammaticality). But what of other linguistic intuitions? The various 
judgments that have been called ‘linguistic intuitions’—for example, those with which this 
chapter starts—may not form a natural kind. Different kinds of linguistic intuition may have 
difference etiologies and require different accounts of why they are evidence. In principle, 
Devitt’s view could be right about some, wrong about others; and where it’s wrong, a Voice of 
Competence view incorporating the content requirement may likewise be right for some, but not 
for others. Let’s consider some cases. 
What of judgements that a string is acceptable? There is an obvious asymmetry here. In 
such cases, there is presumably no error signal to play an etiological role, so the content of the 
intuition would not seem to be the content of some output of the language faculty. A possibility 
is that, while error signals lead to judgments of unacceptability, their absence leads to judgments 
of acceptability. As for satisfaction of the content requirement: well, the suggestion was 
restricted to some linguistic intuitions—perhaps judgments of acceptability are not among them. 
But an alternative to invoking merely the absence of error signals would instead extend the 
account to encompass positive, “non-error” signals. Perhaps monitoring mechanisms, when 
functioning properly, should be construed as always vigilant and thus always in effect receiving 
a signal. The absence of an error signal would then be itself a signal of proper functioning—
perhaps, further, a state with content to the effect that: This string is acceptable. If so, the content 
requirement could be satisfied after all, and the Voice of Competence view extended to 
judgments of acceptability.10 
There is, however, another possibility to consider. Perhaps what’s causally and 
epistemically most significant for judgments of acceptability is neither the absence of error 
signals nor the presence of a positive ‘no error’ signal, but rather the speaker’s having 
comprehended what was said. As we saw, Chomsky incorporates comprehensibility into his 
gloss on acceptability. Indeed, having noted this possibility, one might challenge the need for 
error signals in accounting for unacceptability judgments as well: perhaps it suffices that one not 
comprehend the string. But it wouldn’t follow that error signals do not play a role. Even if one 
factor would suffice, both might be present. (The same source could cause both the signal and 
(ultimately) the failure to comprehend.) In any event, adverting to comprehension cannot serve 
as a complete account. For there are strings that are readily comprehended but also readily 
judged unacceptable, such as ‘She seems sleeping.’ Chomsky’s gloss doesn’t require only 
comprehensibility.11 
                                                 
10 One might worry about cases where an unacceptable sentence is judged acceptable (at least at 
first or unreflectively)—as with plural attraction (‘The key to the cabinets are on the table’) and, 
more persistently, comparative illusions (‘More people have been to France than I have’). Why 
doesn’t the error signal yield an unacceptability judgment here? If it doesn’t, this needn’t be an 
objection: error signals might not always succeed in generating appropriate linguistic intuitions; 
and our judgments of (un)acceptability needn’t be infallible. But, in any event, the question’s 
presupposition that there is an error signal in such cases may be mistaken. Perhaps the question 
should be: how do such strings get pass the parser without generating an error signal? Just as 
visual illusions provide insight into the fine structure of visual processing, such cases can 
illuminate the quirks of linguistic processing (Wagers et al. 2009; Wellwood et al. 2018). 
11 Another, more contentious reply to the suggested alignment of comprehension and 
acceptability would invoke alleged cases of uncomprehended strings judged acceptable, such as 
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That said, we can certainly assign comprehension or the lack thereof a significant role in 
the generation and grounds of (un)acceptability judgments, without challenging the error signal 
suggestion. The error signal account needn’t exhaust the etiology for linguistic intuitions 
generally or for any specific kind of linguistic intuition. And allowing a role for 
(in)comprehension is not in tension with our aim of elaborating on Maynes & Gross’ (2013) 
reply to Devitt’s etiological challenge. Indeed, it meshes with it, since the fact of 
(in)comprehension also yields data for the linguist’s inference to best explanation, data that can 
be relatively robust to variation in background theory. Note that, contrary to Devitt’s complaint, 
we do have some idea in this case how one gets from embodied grammatical constraints to the 
linguistic intuition. Of course, major gaps exist in our knowledge of utterance understanding 
(that’s what much of linguistics is about), but there’s no further special gap introduced by 
linguistic intuitions of this sort. 
Adverting to comprehension in such cases, however, responds to the etiological challenge 
without satisfying the Voice of Competence’s content requirement. Devitt (2006b: 118), in 
raising the challenge, maintains that what’s delivered to central systems is the “message”—i.e., 
bracketing delicate semantic/pragmatic issues, something like the content of what is said—not 
information that leads to arriving at it (recall that Devitt has in mind information about 
grammaticality). I would suggest that what’s delivered is rather something like that the speaker 
said that P in uttering S (mutatis mutandis for other speech acts).12 Either way, the content of the 
intuition itself is indeed not delivered. But yet we can see how the comprehension story could 
allow a simple transition from the fact of (in)comprehension to a judgment of 
(un)acceptability—modulo the contribution of an error signal. 
Comprehension plays a significant role in other linguistic intuitions as well—for 
example, judgments of co-reference and truth-value judgments. But here it’s not just a matter of 
whether one comprehends, but also of what one takes the content to be. For example, to answer 
whether the bolded terms in ‘John’s roommates met him at the restaurant’ co-refer, one in effect 
reports whether one understood it to be John whom the roommates met at the restaurant. Of 
course, answering the question so formulated requires some meta-linguistic awareness (and more 
specifically in this case possession of the concept of co-reference), as does any meta-linguistic 
judgment. To that extent, the judgment goes beyond mere comprehension of what it said, though 
                                                 
lines from Jabberwocky or particularly inscrutable bits of philosophy (Rey this volume; 
forthcoming). To my knowledge, judgments concerning such cases haven’t been investigated in 
a controlled experimental setting (though see Pallier et al. 2011 for neurolinguistic investigation). 
But, in addition, a potential counter-reply is that they are sufficiently understood, insofar as 
subjects construct a metalinguistic or deferential concept to handle the problematic open-class 
terms (borogoves, whatever they are)—cf. Higginbotham (1989). Incidentally, another possible 
use of such cases (if they are granted) might be to bolster the possibility of useable intuitive 
judgments of grammaticality (cf. Rey this volume; forthcoming). 
12 That the string and not just its content is delivered can be so even if the string is then more 
easily forgotten (Sachs 1967). Note that including the string in what’s delivered as output to 
central systems raises the question of how the string is represented at this stage. To the degree 
that structural information is preserved, this again might provide resources for those who would 
defend the possibility of privileged access to more specific linguistic features. Whether—and if 
so, to what extent and in what ways—syntactic features are perceptually experienced (as 
phonemes, morphemes, order, etc. are) is a related, delicate question. 
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not much.13 (Parallel remarks apply to other judgments concerning what “readings” a subject 
gets.) For truth-value judgments it likewise matters, not just that one comprehends the sentence, 
but also what content one assigns it. In this case, the judgment goes beyond one’s 
comprehending the sentence in a further way: one must assess that content against some 
scenario. Having a capacity to do so in a certain range of cases, however, is arguably in part 
constitutive, or highly diagnostic, of one’s capacity for comprehending the sentence. (Of course, 
one must also exploit one’s grasp of the concept of truth to form the appropriate meta-linguistic 
judgment.) 
Moreover, in these cases where what matters is what one takes the content to be, not only 
do we have some understanding of the intuition’s etiology (to the extent that we understand the 
etiology of comprehension), but also—insofar as the intuition amounts to little beyond 
comprehension—the content requirement is fulfilled and arguably the Voice of Competence is 
vindicated.14 Note in particular that Devitt’s characterization of linguistic competence’s role in 
generating grammaticality judgments—as supplying material for a central system response—
seems inapt in these cases where the intuition just is, or goes just a bit beyond, comprehending 
what was said. 
Do error signals play a role with these linguistic intuitions? In positive cases—where the 
terms do co-refer (where one gets the reading) or where what is said is judged true—what one 
understands the sentence to say seems much more significant, even if the absence of an error-
signal (or the presence of positive non-error signals) is concomitant. But the matter is less clear 
with at least some negative cases. Suppose the terms do not co-refer, or one judges the sentence 
false. Does the subject’s understanding of what was said supply the resources necessary to arrive 
at these judgments without recourse to error signals? One way to suggest a role for error signals 
would implicate them in processes of belief formation and maintenance in general. Perhaps such 
processes involve a monitoring system for one’s epistemic states, where clashes between an 
entertained thought and other beliefs can yield an error signal (perhaps sometimes a conscious, 
pre-judgmental feeling of wrongness) that leads to the thought’s rejection—and perhaps such 
processes are implicated in our subject’s negative verdicts. The suggestion would require 
independent motivation (why think error signals are required, as opposed to operations that 
directly adjust beliefs in response to reasons?).15 In any event, these would not be error signals 
generated by specifically linguistic monitoring mechanisms. 
                                                 
13 One could eliminate the meta-linguistic element in this case by telling the subject that John’s 
roommates met him at the restaurant (using those words) and asking whether it was John whom 
they met. This task would not involve linguistic intuitions if one defines them to be meta-
linguistic judgments. The difference does not seem to amount to much in this case. Note further 
that if comprehension involves delivering to central systems a content that relates what is said to 
the string uttered (as suggested above), then, depending on the details of what’s represented, this 
metalinguistic element may be included in comprehension, even if not in the expressed 
judgment. 
14 More fully defending this would require unbracketing the delicate semantics/pragmatics 
issues. But see Sperber & Wilson (2002). 
15 David Pereplyotchik rightly points out that an analogous charge could be raised against 
positing error signals in language monitoring. The question is simply which models are 
empirically justified. 
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But it might also be suggested that error signals generated from monitoring mechanisms 
specifically for language could play a role, at least in some cases. When one considers whether 
the bolded terms in ‘Sally gave her the book’ co-refer, one might not only consider how one 
naturally understands the sentence, but also attempt to find a reading where they do co-refer—all 
the more so if one’s asked whether they can co-refer. In such a case, one’s failed attempts might 
involve error signals (whether from a violated grammatical constraint, a mismatch between the 
parse and the semantic supposition, or a pragmatic violation) that ground one’s judgment. The 
possibility of a language-specific error signal is less obvious for truth-value judgments. But 
candidates could be truth-value judgments concerning the special case of strings that are 
“analytically” false in the sense that they can be known to be false just by an exercise of one’s 
linguistic competence (Pietroski 2002). 
I have been suggesting that comprehension may play a much more significant role with 
some linguistic intuitions than do error signals. But there are also cases where it’s clear that 
comprehension (in the sense of understanding) plays no role whatsoever. Consider phonological 
intuitions, such as judgments as to whether a stimulus is a pronounceable, or a possible word, in 
one’s language. Comprehension plays no role in one’s assessment of /fant/ and /zgant/. The error 
signal account, on the other hand, neatly extends to such cases (though, since now the source of 
the signal is different, perhaps so is the signal’s content, if the content is specific). Again, an 
account that focuses on comprehension is incomplete. 
Finally, consider sociolinguistic intuitions such as judgments of leave-taking (the last of 
our opening examples). The processes by which these are formed may be altogether different. 
One might try arguing that there’s a role for error signals or comprehension. Perhaps one 
attempts to simulate leave-taking in imagination and registers a feeling of wrongness with some 
candidates (though the feeling’s source may not be specifically linguistic); perhaps one 
“understands” some of the candidates as differing in their linguistically-encoded level of 
formality or politeness. But another possibility is that one forms an empirical judgment based on 
one’s memory of past usage. Such cases might fit Devitt’s model well. 
Linguistic intuitions thus may differ in their etiologies, and a single intuition may have 
several language-specific bases. We have suggested error signals play an etiological role, but not 
that an account that adverts only to them is complete. Comprehension plays a significant role 
with some linguistic intuitions, and perhaps other bases matter as well—for example, indices and 
feelings of effort and fluency, briefly mentioned in Section 6 (cf. Luka 2005). 
 
8. Why not intuitions elsewhere? 
In considering the etiology of other linguistic intuitions, we mentioned the possibility of 
monitoring mechanisms for other aspects of cognition and behavior; and earlier we noted that 
forward models are common in accounts of motor control. The possibility that monitoring 
systems are ubiquitous—more specifically, monitoring that involves error signals—connects to 
another challenge Devitt raises for the Voice of Competence view. In some sense, he says, we 
have “embodied rules” for swimming, typing, and other skills. If “embodied rules” of language 
yield intuitions that provide fruitful evidence in linguistic theorizing, why don’t “embodied 
rules” for swimming etc. do the same? Adapting this question to our present discussion, we can 
ask: if such monitoring is ubiquitous, why don’t error signals concerning swimming etc. provide 
the basis for fruitful theorizing in those domains? I conclude by providing a reply. 
First, judgments analogous to linguistic intuitions do play a central evidentiary role in 
various domains—most obviously in perception science. So, to that extent, linguistics is not a 
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special case. Indeed, even acceptability judgments more specifically (or something very much 
like them) are exploited in some domains, such as music cognition (Patel et al. 2008; 
Featherstone et al. 2013) and moral psychology (Cushman 2015). 
But what about the sort of motor skills Devitt emphasizes? There is no a priori reason 
why intuitions could not supply fruitful evidence in these domains—and some instances can be 
found. For example, Ward & Williams (2003) had soccer players of different skill levels view 
video clips and then answer questions concerning to which players teammates could pass and 
which was most likely. We may grant, however, that judgments about exercises of a motor skill 
or their products are less commonly exploited as evidence concerning those skills. Why might 
this be so? 
There are a variety of possible (non-exclusive) explanations. It could simply be that other 
methods have proven sufficiently fruitful to have occupied these fields so far. But there may also 
be differences that would explain why we should not expect intuitions ever to play a central role. 
Most relevantly to our topic, the usefulness of intuitions in linguistics, as opposed to swimming, 
may in part reflect the crucial role of a dedicated, more-or-less modular mechanism with its 
proprietary quirks, recursivity, and interface constraints. That is, intuitions may provide fruitful 
evidence for theorizing about (aspects of) language, but not about swimming, precisely because 
something like the Voice of Competence view is correct in this domain. 
Other differences may also be relevant. For example, many skills arguably lack an 
analogue of comprehension, in two senses. First, for most skills, to exteroceptively perceive 
some exercise of it is arguably not itself to exercise the skill: watching someone swim is not 
itself swimming, perhaps contrary to some mirror-neuron theorists.16 Second, linguistic 
comprehension involves understanding what someone said. But, for many motor skills, their 
exercise does not involve understanding the actions of an agent, in particular understanding their 
(communicative) intentions. This is relevant to intuitions in that, as we’ve noted, for some 
linguistic intuitions, comprehending what was said just is, or is almost, the forming of the 
intuition itself. Finally, comprehension in this second sense is connected to the particular 
demands for coordination found in communication, which is among the primary functions that 
language subserves. To be sure, there is synchronized swimming. But arguably the specific 
forms coordination takes in language use (asking for clarification of an ambiguous or just hard-
to-hear utterance, engaging in lexical negotiation) require or at least promote a capacity for meta-
linguistic awareness that, perhaps as a by-product, renders language-users especially able to 
provide useful intuitions in this domain. Language-related education—most obviously, years of 
concentrated training in reading and writing—may likewise play a role (cf. Schütze 1996). This 
is not to deny that the exercise of other skills can involve coordination with others and the 
comprehension of intentions. But when they do, as with soccer, we’ve seen that judgment data 
may be useful after all. More generally, exercising different kinds of motor skill may make 
varying demands on cognitively-driven conscious control; Devitt’s examples may simply fall on 
the less demanding end (cf. Montero 2016; Gregory et al. 2016). 
Here and above, this exercise in empirically-motivated speculation deploys a fair number 
of ‘maybe’s and ‘perhaps’s. But, whether the suggestions pan out or not, they at least provide 
                                                 
16 Interoception in production may be in some sense an aspect of the exercise—and, again, in 
principle could serve as a source of evidence. But, as noted above, judgments formed on the 
basis of interoception in production are not analogous to typical linguistic intuitions, which are 
responses to externally-given language-like stimuli. 
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“the beginnings of a positive answer” to the questions we have posed, however transformed 
those questions may be from Devitt’s. 
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